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Introduction 
 
Divisions between binary terms always sooner or later return, like the repressed, in 
displaced shapes within each of the terms of the given opposition.   In accordance with 
this structural necessity, modern reason splits at its inception—which replays ancient 
models in displaced forms—into rationalist and empiricist methodologies.1   We see 
progressively in this Special Issue that splitting—often regarded as the fundamental 
defensive mechanism of the “borderline”—belongs to the structure of reason itself; 
reason, or mental health, is always already carried beyond its edge by this splitting that 
constitutes it.   The dispute between the rationalist and empiricist approaches—which is 
certainly one of the principal forms such splitting takes, and which organizes Western 
philosophical discussion from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries—is still 
very much with us, and not just in the standard undergraduate modern philosophical 
history course “From Descartes to Kant.”  The dispute persists despite Kant’s valiant 
and radically rigorous attempt to put an end to it during the late Enlightenment, an 
attempt that, in his own way, Freud renews, as I will suggest below.  Indeed, this dispute 
still powerfully determines (and obscures), as I would like to begin to show here, the 
polemics between different schools of psychoanalytic thought and treatment, notably 
but of course not exclusively where the question of the “borderline” comes up.    
The factual presence of this methodological differentiation tends, however, to 
receive insufficient critical attention.  This is because we often prefer for various 
reasons—philosophical ignorance, the ease of ad hominem rhetoric, vaguely patriotic or 
disciplinary provinciality—to use national terms (“French” or “Anglo-American”) and 
authorial names (“Freudian,” “Kleinian,” “Lacanian,” “Jungian”2), or strictly 
psychoanalytic school terminology (like “drive-theory” vs. “object relations”) to 
characterize different approaches in the psychoanalytic field, rather than more general 
or philosophical, epistemological paradigms.  But these paradigms lurk hidden behind or 
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within national designations (and hence authorial names) because epistemological 
ideologies (and their textual traditions) set down deep roots in national discourses.  
This is why it is crucial to look beyond proper names and national identifications to 
unearth the role played by these epistemological paradigms in the structuring of 
psychoanalytic thought.  For only such a work of philosophico-historical memory can 
enable us to take critical distance from the polemical claims of some—and perhaps all—
of the sub-traditions within psychoanalysis.   To understand methodological dogmas 
both in their one-sided arbitrariness (which may, however, also be inescapable) and in 
their entanglement in a discursive project to externalize and control the irrational (both 
as madness and as faith) is to increase one’s capacity to resist, at least to some extent, 
the irrationality of these presuppositions and the polemics that they dictate.  Such 
resistance remains desirable, even as—and precisely because—the desire that subtends 
it is no doubt “guilty” of a certain participation in madness: it is madness to resist (the 
madness of method).    
 The tensions between French, specifically Lacanian psychoanalysis, and Anglo-
American, ego-psychological and/or object relations psychoanalysis often take the form 
of mutual disdain or indifference, needless to say.  Yet these tensions cast their shadow 
on any contemporary involvement in psychoanalytic theory, especially from the 
standpoint of the humanities, and also more narrowly concerning the question of the 
“borderline” posed here.  It is on these tensions—against the background of the 
Freudian text (which is linguistically and culturally neither French nor English, as one 
knows but perhaps insufficiently reflects upon)—that I will try to throw here some 
preliminary methodological-historical light to supplement and frame the reading of the 
essays in this section.    
Because the Lacanian tradition develops within a French milieu, it is not 
surprising that Lacan should have repeatedly—and across his entire career—articulated 
his understanding of Freud’s invention in terms of Descartes’ philosophy.3  (On the 
other hand, this was not inevitable, for there are of course non-Lacanian analysts in 
France like André Green, and Lacanian-influenced analysts who are also tied to Anglo-
American—and in particular object-relations focused—analytic traditions, such as Julia 
Kristeva, who has made the most of the “borderline” category, specifically in terms of 
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“abjection,” as I discuss in passing below.)  The rationalist tendency of the French 
tradition descending from Descartes marks Lacan’s thought not only through this 
specific extensive dialogue with Descartes (a complex topic we can only note here 
without exploring in the extensive detail it deserves), but in general through the 
theoreticist and philosophical leanings of Lacan’s thought, through his interest in 
mathematical and logical models, and through his very theory of the object a as self-
given internally through the fundamental fantasy.4  In Lacan’s multiple approaches to 
Descartes’ famous phrase “I think, therefore I am”—always in tension with Lacan’s 
interest in Heidegger—the enduring stress is on the attempt to avoid the 
substantivation of the subject, as is reflected in the rift Lacan always establishes between 
the “I think” and the “I am,” or thinking and being, subjectivity and substantiality.5  
Nonetheless, Lacan repeatedly insists on an intimate connection between Cartestian 
rationalism and the Freudian subject.6   
From the perspective of this rationalist tradition, an empiricist’s dependence on 
sense perception as origin of all knowledge appears to be based on a kind of irrational 
(and as it were Lutheran or Calvinist) faith, faith in the unmediated data of sense and the 
immediate givenness of the natural object.  This faith amounts, further, for the 
rationalist tradition, to a kind of madness, stupidity, or naïveté (various names for 
irrationality), although people—even rationalists—don’t always say directly what they 
mean.   From this (French) rationalist perspective, rooted in the self-certainty of the 
cogito established by the path of radical doubt, the unreliability of the senses—a kind of 
imaginary function—was already established at the very outset of the Cartesian path of 
radical doubt in the Meditations.  Moreover, the questionable character of immediately 
given nature has been reinforced in the French tradition by innumerable neoclassical and 
post-neoclassical developments, from the French gardening tradition to the decadence 
of the late nineteenth century—according to which (as the great French writer Oscar 
Wilde insisted) nature imitates art, and not the other way around—to the structuralist 
revolution.7  It should hardly be surprising that in such a context the realism, naturalism, 
and pragmatism of ego-psychology would have become the target of a sustained critique 
by Lacan and his followers.  Not that Lacanianism is wrong to articulate this critique, but 
simply that the critique is rooted in the self-evidences of a finite (though grand) 
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methodological and national tradition, and a specific notion of truth as self-certainty (or 
self-experience), that are posed against another, complementary but incompatible, 
tradition and truth-concept.    
 The empiricist tradition in turn since Locke, Berkeley, and Hume—so deeply 
rooted in our Anglo-American consciousness that we can barely imagine any sane 
alternative to this very general approach—regards given, perceptible, objective reality as 
the touchstone of true knowledge qua correspondence.  For this tradition, the 
rationalist reliance on innate ideas is tantamount to basing reason on faith in a 
revelation.   It means remaining dependent on traditional dogmas (in an implicitly 
catholicizing mode), dogmas that do not qualify as “science” worthy of the public, 
common sphere.   To be “reasonable” means, for an empiricist, to be “in touch with 
reality,” as we say colloquially in English and thereby incontrovertibly demand.  It means: 
to have a firm grasp on the objects in one’s environment.  Accordingly, for Anglo-
American analysis, Freud’s “reality-ego” takes on great prominence, and mental health 
appears as a practical adaptation to what is.  From this perspective, to oppose or 
question the primacy of reality—as Lacan does, for example, in the programmatic 
address from 1936, “Beyond the Reality Principle” (Écrits 58-74)—appears either mad, 
or stupid, or at best näive, like an outdated religion, although here too people—in this 
case, empiricists—do not always say precisely what they mean.   Increasingly philosophy 
itself—unless, say, as philosophy of science or pragmatically oriented ethics—appears as 
(practically, e.g. clinically) beside the point, an anachronistic attempt to imagine how one 
would like things to be, at a time when science is there to help us figure out how things 
actually are.  Theoreticism becomes a luxury of the upper classes and others with 
continental European pretensions, like French neo-classical theater quaintly irrelevant or 
even morally-politically reprehensible, whereas case studies and empirical research—on 
mother-child interactions, or primate attachments, or neurophysiology for those who 
are really up to date—are where “the rubber hits the road.”  This perspective, too, is 
not entirely wrong, but it is one-sided at best, and only a particular cultural and 
philosophical reality constitutes the empiricist approaches for which reality is the only 
thing there is, i.e. the only ontological modality worth taking seriously.   
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In sum, each of the two basic forms of “reason”—rationalist and empiricist—
labels its methodological opposite “unreason,” one-sidedly and arbitrarily, before it even 
approaches the thematic (i.e. post-methodological) question of the essences of unreason 
and reason, thereby commiting a massive petitio principii that goes largely unnoticed 
within each tradition.   Indeed, one can go further to argue that these positions are not 
simply opposed but that, as in the Kantian dialectic (and not by chance), they 
immanently switch places without being aufgehoben (Hegelian-style) into a higher unity.8   
Lacan’s critique of “adaptation,” for example, indicts ego-psychology for being so firmly 
committed to the recognition of reality that it fails to recognize the reality of changing 
social mores, and of legitimate subjective push-back, and so of the necessity of the 
alteration of these mores under the pressure of social movements and individual 
desires.9  This Lacanian critique—which amounts to the suggestion that ego-psychology 
fails to recognize and to think the Real itself—thereby invokes a version of the very 
principle of reality against the ego-psychologist’s own commitment to it.    
Conversely, when ego-psychology questions Lacanian rationalism from an 
empiricist/realist point of view, it does so necessarily, if perhaps often implicitly, in the 
name of rationality, in the face of the apparent irrationalism implied by Lacanian 
rationalism.  For example, the theory of the “borderline” personality itself will 
necessarily question the felt dogmatism (and hence irrationality) of the insistence on the 
three nosological categories (i.e. neurosis, psychosis, and perversion) as sacrosanct.  
Likewise, Anglo-American analysis will question the apparent irrationalism entailed in 
the paradoxical or self-contradictory, seemingly pessimistic Lacanian insistence that the 
subject must find a way of mediating between the social bond and the unbound drives, 
between which from a Lacanian point of view there can be, at the same time, no real 
mediation.  It is not, after all, only Hegel who believes that the real is the rational, the 
rational real.  The two principal methodological perspectives of modern reason are 
bound up with one another, then, in a mutually constitutive structure, even as they 
remain mutually opposed.   
 But where is Freud in this politico-epistemological dialectic?   Although I cannot 
demonstrate but only adumbrate this here, I want to suggest that Freud’s texts are 
situated at approximately the point where this dialectic becomes aware of itself as a 
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dialectic.   In contrast to the Anglo-American (predominantly empiricist) and Lacanian 
(strongly rationalist) traditions, Freud’s texts are closely bound up with the Kantian 
tradition. This is partly due to Freud’s belonging to a German-language culture, but 
more directly due to the fact that he trained in the years when neo-Kantianism was 
prominent, and still more directly due to the fact that his philosophical teacher and 
mentor, Franz Brentano, developed his philosophical psychology within this neo-Kantian 
milieu, even if he tilted it in the direction of empirical studies.   In a broadly post-Kantian 
tradition, Freud sees the dialectical opposition and intertwinement of empiricism and 
rationalism, and tries to reach beyond this dialectic by situating and relativizing these 
tendencies within a larger metapsychological and diagnostic structure.  Freud pursues in 
the metapsychology a mapping of the conditions of the possibility of the experience of 
desire (as Lust, Unlust, Wunsch, Triebregung, etc.).  The various patterns of desire, or 
diagnostic categories (“subjective structures” as Lacan will call them), are rooted in 
differential interrelations of the Freudian “faculties”—or “psychic instances.”   These 
“psychic instances,” then, serve as “transcendental” aprioris (whose constitution is now, 
however, unlike in Kant, part of a genetic narrative).  Freud alludes indirectly to the 
analogy between his intervention and Kant’s when he speaks of his “Copernican 
Revolution,” echoing Kant’s claim to having accomplished such a revolution.  And when 
he describes the “critical” instance of the superego as a “categorical imperative,” he 
indicates thereby that Kant is an important and problematic figure in his own 
philosophical-methodological conscience.10    
We cannot, of course, detail here the complexities involved in the philosophico-
historically mediated displacement from the transcendental epistemic faculties of 
understanding, reason, and reflexive judgment (the latter combining unifying 
subsumption under a concept with the infinite multiplication of conceptual possibilities) 
into the transcendental-historical psychosexual faculties of ego, superego, and id (whose 
two principles are those of erotic unification and deathly division).11   It is nonetheless 
useful for the “borderlines” discussion to recall that the Kantian understanding 
(Verstand) serves legitimately only as an instrument for the empirical grasp of objects, as 
a scientific-technical faculty, and that the Freudian reality-ego resembles it functionally in 
this regard.  The rationalist faculty in Kant, in turn, is of course reason (Vernunft) itself, 
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whose use Kant ultimately sanctions only in an ethical sense (for where reason posits 
objects in a “speculative” mode, it becomes unreason, i.e. pure madness).  The 
corresponding rationalist instance in Freud is the superego, the potential for whose 
fanatical madness consists in its drivenness by the id, whose eroto-thanatological energy 
cannot distinguish between production and destruction.   
 Finally, however, both Kant and Freud try to envision paradoxical limit-
experiences—experiences of that which, properly speaking, cannot be experienced—in 
order to formulate a kind of minimal synthesis of the subject otherwise split between its 
rationalism and empiricism.  Kant construes the (negative) unification of the empirical 
and rational faculties (or discourses), Verstand and Vernunft—as the opening essay by 
Alexander Mathäs discussed—in the aesthetic sphere in terms of sublimity, an 
experience in which a nonpresentable object presents itself.  Freud, for his part, phrases 
such a (negative) unification of the split subject in his account of the uncanny—which the 
essay above by Samuel Weber thematizes in relation to anxiety—as the aesthetics of the 
return of the repressed.  For the uncanny is the paradoxical intrusion into reality of 
what is not of the order of reality, the experience of what cannot be an object of 
experience, the experience of the impossible (which Lacan will call the Real).  In Kant, 
the sublime operates this negative unification of the faculties as a manifestation of 
reflexive judgment (which in turn remains split between teleological objectivity and 
aesthetic subjectivity), in accordance with the Enlightenment desire to establish critical 
judgment as the original or central principle of the human.  In Freud, one might argue, 
the uncanny operates the negative unification of ego and superego (as objective and 
subjective, real and unreal), qua manifestation of the id (split between eros and 
thanatos), in line with the late nineteenth century understanding of desire (or will) as 
the origin or essence of the human. The “borderline”—like the very movement (if not 
the specific contents) of dialectics, perhaps—is epistemically uncanny in this sense, as 
the site of the interpenetration of “madness”—a “negativity,” as Derrida had said, or a 
limitless hallucinated voice, as the GIFRIC analysts argue, that cannot be represented—
and “reason”—or the regime of representation itself: the limit between limits and 
unlimitation.  Nathanael, in Hoffmann’s tale “The Sandman,” would be the “borderline” 
par excellence.   
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 But as I indicated above, Freud does not just root the two methods of modern 
reason—i.e. the opposition between reason and unreason as this opposition recurs 
within reason—in “psychic instances” (or psychoanalytic “faculties”).  Rather, and 
thereby, he implies a “diagnosis” of each method.  That is,  he redefines the opposed 
methods diagnostically as subjective structures—one as neurosis and one as psychosis.  
We can glimpse this twofold diagnosis of epistemology (including the epistemology of 
diagnosis) by looking at Freud’s definitions of these two terms, and of the “borderline” 
area that lies between them, in the essay entitled “Neurosis and Psychosis” from 1924 
(Freud, III, 331-37). 
Taking as our point of departure the essay “Neurosis and Psychosis,” we find 
that reason and unreason, science and religion (or philosophy), and hence empiricism 
and rationalism are initially split between, or distributed across, the neurotic and the 
psychotic positions.12  The neurotic assumes—excessively—the limits of reality and 
represses the impulses from the id, giving rise to inhibitions and limitations of all sorts.  
The neurotic is, as it were, subjected to and identified with, an overactive and 
domineering reality-ego.  The positivist scientist fits well into this category, despite 
Freud’s attempt to accomodate his own work to the model of positive science.  Indeed, 
Freud questions in many ways the limitations of science, for example, when as psychiatry 
it denies any meaning to dreams, thereby implying that his own “science” will have to 
exceed this mechanical-objectivist model.13   The psychotic, in turn, suppresses or 
denies limits represented by external reality, like an “ought” with no relation to an “is” 
(Kantian practical reason), producing a loss of reality, a limitless void into which the id-
impulses have the opportunity, and also the misfortune, to expand.14   The psychotic is 
the rationalist whose pure reason has not yet been subjected to any critique, which is 
why Freud tends to associate philosophy (as a rationalism) with psychosis.  
But Freud does not stop here.  He goes on to describe two more structures 
that comprise, on my reading, the double limit between neurosis and psychosis.  First, 
he considers the structure that lies between these two, neurosis and psychosis, a 
structure he designates as the “narcissistic psychoneuroses.”   The “narcissistic” 
position lies between the other two because here neither reality-ego nor id is 
suppressed, but rather the superego, which conflicts with reality, on the one hand, and 
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the drives, on the other, while representing the interests of both in an obscure fashion.  
The “narcissistic psychoneurosis,” which like melancholy struggles with internalized but 
unmourned others, recognizes reality and desire but tries to shut out any sense of its 
own inadequacy or limitation, as in the grandiosity of the current “narcissistic 
personality disorder” type.  But if narcissism tries to suppress the superego—which 
mediates the relationship between reality-ego and id, or between reality and drive, 
unifying them while it negates each—then narcissism both suppresses reality and drive 
(which the superego represents) and affirms them (because the superego also negates 
both of them).  Indeed, because the superego is turned against itself (suppressing what it 
enables), to suppress the superego is also to affirm it (and the superego returns in 
pathological narcissism as a persecutorial Other).  Such, it would seem, is the 
complexity of the narcissistic position.  
Not suprisingly, however, this narcissistic Mittelglied (or intermediate member—a 
Kantian expression for the faculty of reflexive judgment) is doubled—like all borders as 
they are drawn—by a second intermediate category between neurosis and psychosis, 
this time the category of health (“ohne Erkrankung” [336]).  How should we understand 
this doubling more precisely?  If, as I have been suggesting, the opposition between 
neurosis and psychosis recapitulates that between reason and madness (albeit within the 
realm of madness in the modern form of mere mental illness), then the border between 
neurosis and psychosis will be doubled in the specific sense that one of its manifestations 
will have to be on the side of reason (or mental health), while the other remains on the 
side of madness (or mental illness).   The double of narcissism will be the mental health, 
or rationality, with which psychoanalysis itself, here in Freud’s text, will want to identify 
itself, and in which it will want to identify its own methodological basis.    
So how does the healthy self (i.e. the healthy ego as a synthetic site of identity 
rather than as a reality-ego) mediate between the demands of reality, superego, and 
drive?  Oddly, Freud says, by dividing and deforming itself, becoming inconsistent (and in 
this sense irrational), in a manner that Freud sees as analogous to the “sexual 
perversions” (337).  The  “ego can then avoid a break in any direction [that is, with 
reality, id, or superego] in that it deforms itself, accepts losses of its unity [Einbußen an 
seiner Einheitlichkeit], even divides and splits itself [sich zerklüftet und zerteilt].  Thereby 
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appear the inconsistencies, twistedness, and foolishness of humans in a light similar to 
their sexual perversions, through assumption of which they of course spare themselves 
repressions [rückten die Inkonsequenzen, Verschrobenheiten und Narrheiten der Menschen in 
ein ähnliches Licht wie ihre sexuellen Perversionen, durch deren Annahme sie sich ja 
Verdrängungen ersparen]” (336-7).   Narcissism—whose conflict with, and attempted 
suppression of, the superego involved a complex combination of breaks with, and 
accommodations to, the three instances of reality-ego, drives, and superego itself—is 
doubled by, or haunts, mental health (or the standpoint of the end of analysis), which in 
turn resembles perversion.15  
If the analytical position is to be “critical”—not (of course) in the sense of a 
superego discourse but in the sense of a position that would relativize the (neurotic) 
reality-ego of the empiricist as well as the (superegoic and delusional) theoreticism of 
speculative rationalism, then it will have to do two things.  It will have to bracket the 
“thing” in itself—mourning its loss—and it will have to come to terms with a certain 
fragmentation and even foolishness [Freud spoke of Narrheiten] that bring it into an 
uncanny—or sublime—resemblance to the “narcissistic psycho-neuroses.”  Some such 
worrisome but intriguing (provisional) conclusion seems unavoidable if we pursue the 
methodological-diagnostic implications of Freud’s text on “Neurosis and Psychosis. ”  
And are not the Kantian renunciation of things-in-themselves, as well as analytic 
disengagement, somewhat reminiscent of a narcissistic withdrawal into the self?  Or do 
we have to overcome our tendency to distinguish between a reasonable distance from 
others and pathological self-involvement?  And would such an overcoming be possible?  
In any case, if in Freud’s search for a position outside of (neurotic) empiricism and 
(psychotic) rationalism the tension between narcissism and mental health goes 
unresolved, one needs to ask: what are the equivalent “borderline” tensions in the 
Anglo-American and French-Lacanian traditions?  Or do these traditions manage to 
avoid such irresolution?  In the remainder of this Introduction, I will focus only on the 
unresolved tensions between these two traditions in their respective approaches to the 
“borderline,” indicating the unresolved tensions within each tradition only in endnotes 
and in passing.     
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Let us consider first what I am characterizing as the empiricist tradition.  How 
does the theory of the "borderline" look in Anglo-American psychoanalysis?  While 
there exists of course significant variation within this discourse, from Melanie Klein to 
Wilfred Bion to Heinz Kohut to Peter Fonagy, in the current context it will have to 
suffice to recall the outlines of Otto Kernberg's important ego-psychological-object-
relations theory of the borderline (already discussed critically above in Juliet F. 
MacCannell’s piece)—which came to prominence in the 1970s, incorporated much of 
the work since the 1940s and 1950s on this topic, and functions today still as a standard 
point of reference.16  For the sake of space, I will further skip over Kernberg's 
descriptive account of the diverse and complex set of potential symptomatic 
manifestations of the “borderline personality organization” (except to note here in 
passing that they include “polymorphous perverse sexual trends” [286]), and focus on 
his structural analysis, and in particular the “specific defensive operations” (299ff) of the 
borderline.   
At the center of these operations is splitting.17   Neurosis and psychosis split 
apart on the site of splitting.  Kernberg determines the context of the discussion of 
splitting and subordinate defenses in the borderline by means of the notion of the 
“internalization of object relationships.”  This internalization requires on the one hand 
the differentiation between self- and object-images, and on the other hand the integration 
or synthesis of infantile “all-good” (libidinally invested) and “all-bad” (aggressively 
invested) images of both the self and other objects into “total object and self 
representations” (301).  This latter, synthetic work, which constitutes the integrated 
subject, retroactively or supplementarily shores up the former work of the 
differentiation between self and object images.  For the synthesis of “all-good” and “ all-
bad” objects minimizes the need for projective mechanisms, which lead to an interlacing 
of the paranoid self with a persecutorial other.  There is, to be sure, a “normal” splitting 
of “internalized object relations into ‘good’ and ‘bad’,” which is due, during the first year 
or so of life, to the “lack of integrative capacity of the ego” prior to the mirror stage.  
But this “normal” splitting mechanism is replaced, as the ego develops in cognitive-
synthetic capacity, by “higher level defensive operations” (299) connected with 
repression.  When this does not occur, however, the persistent prominence of splitting 
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in later years leads to the characteristic (Eriksonian) “identity diffusion” (300) of the 
borderline, and the “sudden and complete reversals of all feelings and conceptualizations 
about a particular person” characteristic of this type of personality organization.   As 
one of Harold Searles' patients illustrates so laconically: “I can't tell you how much I love 
you or how much of a shit I think you are” (Searles 500).  
The persistent splitting entails, in turn, other defensive mechanisms. These 
include first of all “primitive idealization.”  This is “the tendency to see some external 
objects arbitrarily as totally good, in order to make sure that they can protect one 
against the ‘bad’ objects, [a condition] in which there is no real regard for the ideal 
object, but a simple need for it as a protection against a surrounding world of dangerous 
objects” (303).  The flip side of idealization is “projective identification”: the 
externalization of “all-bad, aggressive self and object images,” images the borderline then 
feels s/he has to “attack and control” (304).   “Denial” is further entailed by the splitting, 
because one split-off state or aspect of the self necessarily denies the existence of its 
opposite, and therefore its loss of that opposite.   And finally, the borderline fantasizes 
his or her own “omnipotence” in identification with the “all-good” images, concomitant 
with the “devaluation” of those people and aspects of the world and self that are 
identified with the "all-bad" projections and introjections.  The result of this process of 
splitting and its attendant defense mechanisms is a limited “superego integration” 
apparently akin to what Freud meant by the conflict between ego and superego in the 
“narcissistic psychoneuroses,” and to the problems of the “borderline” with the 
superego that Cantin will point out in her essay as well.   This produces the 
“characterological traits” of the lack of capacity for “empathy with others” (309), the 
“exploitativeness,” and the “narcissism” often seen as part of the borderline picture.18  
The genetic correlative of this structure is for Kernberg the pregenital and especially 
oral aggression that, due to any number of factors concerning nature or nurture, has 
become and remained in some sense excessive.19 
Before considering briefly the sense in which Kernberg’s approach to the 
borderline is an empiricist one, let us consider the example of a Lacanian approach 
provided in this Special Issue.  The article by Lucie Cantin, one of the three senior 
analysts at GIFRIC, on “The Borderline, or the Impossibility of Producing a Negotiable 
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Form in the Social Bond for the Return of the Censored,” argues in Lacanian terms that 
the “borderline personality” finds itself within the subjective structure of neurosis, but 
at a slight distance from hysteria, as an extreme variant.  Such an approach is 
characteristic on the one hand not only of the Lacanian tripartite nosology—neurosis, 
psychosis, perversion—but further of the rationalist/structuralist epistemology that 
subtends it.  If it is not so much the phenomena that dominate the categories, but the 
categories (as a “logic”) that dominate phenomena, then how can there be a 
phenomenon that appears as midway between two constitutive structural categories, 
and the reality of which would have the power to exceed the reach of, and even 
potentially to place into question, the legitimacy of those categories themselves?   A 
logic cannot be empirically contradicted.  And yet, on the other hand, the GIFRIC 
approach is characterized by a frequent and emphatic reference to experience, and it 
therefore includes an empiricist but not scientistic moment, for the reference to 
experience concerns subjective experience that is explicitly nonverifiable.  In accordance 
with this responsiveness to the empirical, Cantin does provide here a specific 
metapsychological account of the “borderline” as distinct from the hysteric (as Bergeron 
broaches a specific account of autism in her contribution above).   
For Cantin, then, the “borderline” is best characterized in terms of “the failed 
experience of an internal limit in the subject with regard to the management of the 
censored. . . jouissance.”   Cantin, who has worked closely together in GIFRIC with 
Apollon and Bergeron for many years, presents this view of the “borderline” here in 
terms of a metapsychological account of “development” that is consistent with those 
provided in the essays by her colleagues.  In the case of the “borderline,” the failure of 
the limit is situated in the Oedipal moment, the phallic phase, when the subject 
otherwise enters the social bond by constituting itself as “an object worthy of love and 
recognition by others.”   This imaginary constitution is that of the “fantasy of seduction,” 
one of the three primary fantasies of Freudian provenience, along with the fantasies of 
castration and the primal scene.  This fantasy of seduction establishes a mediation 
(however problematic and provisional) between the unbound libido of the drives and 
the superegoic injunction to jouissance, on the one hand, and the social order itself, on 
the other.  In terms of the Freud of “Neurosis and Psychosis,” the fantasy of seduction 
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mediates between id and superego, on the one hand, and reality-ego, on the other.  For 
Cantin, in the hysteric the fantasy of seduction has failed subsequent to its initial 
installation, whereas in the “borderline” the fantasy of seduction is never installed or 
established in the first place.   In the “borderline,” what is lacking is the “installation of 
the primacy of the symbolic over the drive,” a primacy that would limit the invasive 
presence of the superego (like a primal scene of oral engulfment), enabling the subject 
to seek its own path in the social-symbolic space for the satisfaction of its drives.  But as 
Cantin conceives the fantasy of seduction here as a temporary and illusory solution, and 
as she conceives of its failure as inevitable, the lack of any synthesized total object here 
in the “borderline” is linked to what Cantin considers a universal human condition, 
rather than simply an error or failing.20   
How, then, do these two positions on the “borderline”—the one emerging from 
Anglo-American ego-psychology and object relations, the other from French Lacanian 
thought (but in a practice-context that is North American)—relate to one another?   
On the one hand, Kernberg’s ego-psychological and object-relations approach to the 
subject or psyche is not merely empiricist and scientistic in orientation and self-
conception.  Beyond this, and above all, it works with a model of the psyche as an 
empiricist being.  That is, it doesn’t merely proceed empirically; it assumes that any 
subject whatsoever essentially proceeds in such a manner.  The focus on the 
“internalization of object relations” makes this clear.  Further, the fact that psychosis is 
determined by the failure to distinguish between two different types of objects (self and 
other objects), while the “borderline” is determined as the failure to synthesize the 
“total object” out of “all-good” and “all-bad” objects, a failure to be a realist, as it were, 
underlines the empiricist conception of the subject once again.    
In contrast, Cantin’s approach is primarily marked by the rationalist tradition, 
again not as opposed to irrationalism or to romanticism but as opposed to empirical 
science.  In place of the inadequate internalization of object relations, she focuses on the 
failure to construct a fantasy of oneself as an object of love, i.e. a more or less purely 
interior operation.   Further, the understanding of the effects of this failure as a “failed 
installation of the primacy of the symbolic over the logic of the drive” presupposes a 
view of the subject as constituted by language, the structuralist version of logos as 
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thought, rather than principally as a perceiver of given referents or objects in the world.  
And finally, the ultimate horizon of Cantin’s analysis—the “impossible” object a as an 
object constituted (or “posited”) in a fundamental fantasy and endlessly pursued in a 
world that cannot empirically contain it—emphasizes the distance from an Anglo-
American-style empiricism.   
These two different views of the subject remain, of course, radically opposed to 
one another.  The empiricist view takes the neurotic (perhaps unwittingly) as its 
normative model for the subject in general, while the rationalist view models its norm 
upon the psychotic (according to Freud, as we saw above, and avowedly in the case of 
the GIFRIC orientation, which was adapted from Lacan and mediated through years of 
work with psychotics at the Psychoanalytic Center for the Treatment of the Psychoses).   
And yet one can see how the two descriptions of the “borderline” might be referring to 
the same population—or aspect of human subjectivity—and one can even indicate the 
point at which it is possible to begin to translate the two descriptions into one another’s 
idioms, if only ultimately to see more clearly where the translation breaks down.    
Where Kernberg speaks of the failure to establish the difference between self and 
other objects, and of the failure to establish the identity between all-good and all-bad self 
and other objects, the fact that the latter failure (supposedly characteristic of 
“borderlines”) ensures the former one (supposedly characteristic of psychosis), even on 
Kernberg’s own account, threatens the very distinction between psychosis and the 
“borderline” that it is supposed to enable.  But even more importantly this fact 
underlines the mutually dependent unity of the two tasks, the task of the differentiation of 
self and world and the task of the identificatory synthesis of total (or what we might call 
ambivalent/ambiguous, mediocre, or castrated) “objects.”    
From a Lacanian viewpoint, however, these tasks would be seen as 
accomplished, however tentatively, only by the inscription or insertion of the subject in 
the symbolic order, as the order of language, exactly the point of transition in the phallic 
phase where Cantin situated a glitch—even if one connected to universal humanity—in 
the development of the “borderline.”  For according to Roman Jakobson (whom, as one 
knows, Lacan followed in his structuralist phase, as registered in such essays as “The 
Insistence of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud” in Écrits), language 
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has two aspects, namely metaphor and metonymy, or (in more logical terms) identity 
and difference.  And it is only the mastery of the play (or game) of identity and 
difference that could tame the imaginary dynamics of “all-good” and “all-bad” and 
advance the subject in its constitution as a subject of lack.   
In short, one crucial point of translation between Kernberg (and Anglo-American 
object-relations theory more generally) and Lacan would be the passage between the 
themes of the subject-object distinction (including the transitional objects of Winnicott) 
and the constitution of whole objects (including the Kleinian shift from paranoid-schizoid 
to depressive phase, in which loss is mourned), on the one hand, and the theme of the 
installation of the symbolic order through the traumatic learning of language, on the 
other hand.21  The divergence between the accounts of the subject’s relation to identity 
and difference offered by the Anglo-American and French-Lacanian psychoanalytic 
traditions becomes less opaque when we understand this divergence in terms of the 
philosophical-methodological traditions or ideologies that overdetermine it.  This 
divergence cannot, therefore, be adjudicated except by reference to those traditions 
and their—at least initially—equal claims on our attention.   
In addition to this divergence, as we have seen in passing, each of these analytic 
approaches to the “borderline” is divided internally by polemical oppositions that 
recapitulate the tension in Freud between narcissism and mental health.  In the Anglo-
American world, the Kernberg-Kohut debate over “borderline” vs. “narcissism” is one 
major instance of such an opposition.  Within the Lacanian world, the difference 
between the assimilation of the “borderline” to neurosis and its assimilation to 
perversion provides an important example.  Whether it is possible to overcome such a 
division in the name of a unified “critical” position for psychoanalysis, or whether the 
enduringly “critical” condition of psychoanalysis requires such internal differentiation 
and instability, is a question that will have to remain open here. 
*         *         * 
The Issue closes with the essay by Michael Stern on “The Face as Fingerprint: 
Mediation, Silence, and the Question of Identity in Ingmar Bergman’s Persona.”  Like the 
opening piece by Mathäs, this essay addresses analysis consciously from just outside the 
border of analytic discourse per se, and like that piece, this one also thematizes 
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narcissism, here primarily through a close reading of Bergman’s film.  After preparing his 
reading of the film with discussions of narrative theory, contemporary performance art, 
and masked ritual, Stern reads the film as an illustration of what can happen when a 
person speaks to a silent other.  In the film, as one may recall, a famous actress—a 
“borderline”?  a “hysteric” ?  a “sadist”?—withdraws into an enduring silence, and is 
cared for, throughout one summer, at a beach house by a young and increasingly 
loquacious nurse, who gradually falls into a desperately amorous identification with the 
actress (the nurse becoming the patient and the patient functioning like a silent analyst), 
and then violently wrenches herself free of this identification at the film’s conclusion.  
Stern implicitly or discreetly reads this structure as a negative or critical model for the 
psychoanalytic situation, in which the silent “analyst”  (here, the sick actress) drives the 
patient (the nurse) almost completely insane.   Stern’s emphasis, which begins with the 
argument that “subjectivity has a narrative component that becomes short circuited in 
the face of an unresponsive silence,” is thus counterposed to the Lacanian emphasis on 
the narrative as an imaginary ego-narrative that needs to be dismantled in order for the 
unconscious to be accessible.  In contrast to the latter orientation, Stern suggests that 
analytical silence/absence can function as a “seduction” into an alienating identification 
with the silent figure of the analyst.  A more dialogical stance would conduce, Stern 
argues, to a more positive and emancipatory process of mutual narrative construction, 
the interplay of identity and difference between two or more speakers.  The essay’s 
argument implies, in other words, that the Lacanian (or classical Freudian) positioning of 
the analyst as absent or silent Other may not be able to avoid the counterproductive 
development of an alienating identification of the analysand with the analyst.  In this 
sense, Stern’s essay could be aligned on the one hand with the Foucauldian skepticism 
about the analytical situation as potentially repressive, and on the other hand with 
recent Anglo-American interrelational models in psychoanalysis.  Such models share 
with his approach the desire to provide the dialogicity that classical Freudian analysis, as 
well as Lacan’s “return to Freud,” both avoid because these latter discourses argue that, 
to the contrary, such dialogicity shores up the narcissistic ego, rather than opening it 
onto what it excludes.   Since Stern’s approach to dialogue does not exclude 
disagreement or conflict from dialogue itself, however, his essay ultimately argues for 
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the dialogue between dialogism and its refusal, perhaps akin to the questioning of the 
non-dialogue between Lacanian and Anglo-American analysis that I have broached here.   
*          *          * 
As I hope to have suggested, and as I think the essays in this Special Issue support, the 
necessary “framework” for critical reflection on the borderlines of the “borderline” 
today begins with the historical and philosophical examination of the split between 
reason and unreason, including (but not exclusively) the neoclassical version of this split.  
In order to orient oneself discursively and methodologically, one must consider further, 
against this background, the historical and theoretical limits of the modern opposition of 
“science” to the “non-scientific” (as faith, art, or persuasion through rhetoric), and the 
role played by the division of philosophical science into empiricism and rationalism in 
the constitution of diverse psychoanalytic traditions (and anti- or non-analytic ones as 
well, for that matter).  Only within such a conceptual “framework” can one begin to 
grasp the ways in which discourses on the “borderline” are engaged in the attempt to 
determine where they themselves stand, and where they fall.  
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1 Leibniz’ attempt to answer Locke point by point in the New Essays provides a glimpse 
into this neoclassical debate as it moves toward its climax in Kant.  The analogy Leibniz 
draws (43) between modern rationalism and Plato, on the one hand, and between 
modern empiricism and Aristotle, on the other hand, provides the point of departure 
for the linkage of the modern debate with its ancient and medieval predecessors.   
2 For an informative and interesting anthology of essays on  “borderlines” from Jungian 
perspectives, see Nathan Schwartz-Salant and Murray Stein.   
3 See Baas and Zaloszyc for a detailed interpretation of Lacan’s involvement with, and 
displacement of, Cartesian thinking, especially in the Seminar XI on the Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis, a seminar held in the same year in which Derrida’s critique of 
Foucault’s reading of Descartes was published.   Balmès details the tensions in Lacan’s 
simultaneous references to Heidegger and Descartes, especially in the chapter on 
“Heidegger et/ou Descartes,” 129-36.   
4 The extremely complex and extensive topic of Lacan’s relationship with philosophy, 
including his relationship with Cartesian thought, is summarized admirably by Charles 
Shepherdson in “Lacan and Philosophy.”   As Shepherdson further reminds us, 
Foucault’s engagement with Descartes in History of Madness is extended in the section 
on “The Cogito and the Unthought” of The Order of Things, where Foucault takes up 
Lacan’s approach to Descartes and generalizes it as the “modern cogito.”   
5 In Tarrying with the Negative, Zizek develops two different forms of the Lacanian trope 
on Descartes, “I am not where I think”: namely, “I think, therefore it ex-sists” (which he 
associates with the feminine “not-all”) and “I am, therefore it thinks” (which he connects 
to the masculine principle of “universality”).  This development follows Zizek’s 
interpretation of Kant’s mathematical antinomies in terms of femininity and of his 
dynamic antinomies in terms of masculinity.  In the more recent Ticklish Subject, Zizek 
devotes the entire book to the project of reasserting the Cartesian subject, as against 
what he—not wrongly—takes to be its quasi-ubiquitous rejection by a large number of 
contemporary directions in thought.   
6 On the connection between the Cartesian tradition and the mathematical formalism 
that Lacan increasingly stressed over the course of his career, see Bernard Burgoyne.   
On the importance of Koyré’s reading of Descartes for Lacan, see especially 79-83.   
7 It is certainly not by chance—though it is wonderful—that the address of the École de 
la Cause Freudienne in Paris is currently 1, rue Huysmans, while that of the Collège 
international de philosophie is 1, rue Descartes.   
8 The Kantian “transcendental dialectic,” perhaps most obviously the section on the 
“antinomies,” in the Critique of Pure Reason precisely and explicitly plays out the tension 
and reversals of position between the empiricist and rationalist positions, who appear 
there in their guise as skepticism (since by this point empiricism seems to have led 
irrevocably to Hume) and dogmatism (which refers to the innatism and metaphysics of 
the rationalists).   
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9 See Philippe Van Haute.   
10 It is for example significant that (in the 18th of the “Introductory Lectures on 
Psychoanalysis,” Studienausgabe I, 283), when Freud speaks of his work as extending the 
narcissistic wounding of the human being that had begun with Copernicus and then been 
exacerbated by Darwin, this point follows his explanation of the symptom as having its 
origin (Woher) in “impressions”  (Eindrücke) and its purpose (Wozu) in an “endopsychic 
process,” in short, his explanation of the symptom as an appearance combining, in a 
Kantian manner, external (empirical) givens with internal (rational-irrational) conditions.  
On the “categorical imperative” as superego, see “Das Ich und das Es,” Studienausgabe, 
III, 302, 315, and “Das ökonomische Problem des Masochismus,” Studienausgabe, III, 351.  
On the “categorical imperative” as a “taboo,” see the Preface to “Totem und Tabu,” 
Studienausgabe, IX, 292.  If Freud both distorts and adopts a “critical” attitude toward 
the (Kantian) “critical” superego, he also—through this very “critique”—follows in many 
respects its Enlightenment dictates.  
11 For a work that carries out with creative boldness and a rare clarity and rigor the 
examination of the relationship between Freudian-Lacanian metapsychology and Kantian 
transcendental critique, see Cutrofello.  If, as Cutrofello argues, psychoanalysis seeks 
“analytic a posteriori” judgements, then in this paradox would be located the tension 
between rational and empirical that, I am suggesting, tends to be softened somewhat by 
Lacan, on the one hand, and Anglo-American ego-psychology/object relations, on the 
other hand.   
12 In “The Finitude of Method: Mourning Theory from the New Criticism to the New 
Vitalism” (forthcoming in Comparative Literature Journal), I establish certain affinities 
between rationalism and obsessive-compulsive and melancholic patterns, on the one 
hand, and between empiricism and hysterical and manic modes, on the other hand.  
Such an approach to epistemology is consistent with the one we find in Freud here to 
the degree that, within neurosis, the opposition between neurosis and psychosis repeats 
itself in displaced form : obsessional ideas share with psychosis delusional cognition, 
while hysteria shares with neurosis generally the distancing from conscious cognition 
that characterizes repression.   Melancholy and mania are the two forms of the 
incomplete mourning that characterizes for Freud the border between neurosis and 
psychosis (see below), and hence they necessarily distribute themselves across its abyss 
within neurosis as well.  –On the Lacanian linkage of Cartesian rationalism with 
obsessive-compulsive patterns, a linkage that philosophically upgrades the latter rather 
than psychologically downgrading the former, see Zizek, Tarrying, 69ff.   
13 See, for example, the criticisms of scientific theories of dream in chapter two on the 
“method” of the interpretation of dreams, in Traumdeutung (Studienausgabe II, 117), and 
the same argument that recurs in “Der Wahn und die Träume in W. Jensens 
Gradiva” (Studienausgabe X, 13-14ff).   
14 The neurotic position in Freud is thus akin to the one of observational science as 
oriented by the mother tongue, while the psychotic position would be one that is, as it 
were, overwhelmingly devoted to listening to the interior voice of the Other, according 
to the schematization of these distinctions in the essays by the GIFRIC analysts 
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represented in this Issue.  Foucault himself speaks of this opposition between limits and 
unlimitation in more philosophico-historical terms in “Preface to Transgression,” where 
the “limitless reign of the limit” is said to impose itself after the “death of God.”  
15 Cf. “The Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defense” from 1938 (Studienausgabe III, 
390-7) in which Freud portrays fetishism as a combination of, on the one hand, the 
renunciation of the id and the denial of the reality of castration, and on the other hand, 
the refusal to do either of these things: “The child does however neither one, or rather, 
he does both at once, which comes down to the same” (391).  The resultant tear in the 
ego (eines Einrisses im Ich, 391-2) remains here in an uncertain relationship with the 
losses of unity (Einbußen an seiner Einheitlichkeit, 336) that the healthy person accepts 
according to Freud in the essay on “Neurosis and Psychosis.”  The resemblance and 
distance in Freud between mental health and perversion, on the one hand, and 
narcissism, on the other hand, is perhaps very close to the resemblance and distance 
that Lacan explores between the discourse of the analyst and its flip side, the discourse 
of the master, in The Other Side of Psychoanalysis.  
16 Unless otherwise indicated, references are to Kernberg, “Borderline Personality 
Organization.”   
17 This view is, of course, not specific to Kernberg alone but represents a consensus 
view of the borderline personality organization, at least in an object-relations influenced 
discourse.  See, for example, J.H. Rey, 206ff, and Fonagy et al, 364-5 passim, and the 
various essays in Stone, ed., Essential Papers.   
18 Here is one of the most prominent and interesting places where the doubling of the 
“borderline” category by “narcissism” becomes the center of a debate within Anglo-
American psychoanalysis, specifically between Kernberg and Heinz Kohut.  Kernberg 
prefers the term "borderline" to the term "narcissism" for this personality structure 
midway between neurosis and psychosis, and in fact sees "narcissism" as a variant of 
"borderline" pathology, where the "pathological grandiose self" of the narcissistic 
personality "compensates for lack of integration of the normal self-concept which is part 
of the underlying borderline personality organization" (Borderline Conditions 266).   While 
I must defer for another occasion detailed discussion of this debate, let me suggest here 
the following irony.  Namely, the Kernberg-Kohut debate arguably plays out this 
doubling in a way that recapitulates within the Anglo-American psychoanalytic discourse, 
and in displacement, the debate between rationalist-structuralist and empiricist-ego-
psychological positions.  Thus, for example, in “Clinical Problems of the Narcissistic 
Personality” (Borderline Conditions 263-314), Kernberg—who seems to have little 
affection for Lacan, but ironically resembles him here, specifically the position Lacan 
developed in “Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis” in Écrits—recalls, against Kohut: that one 
cannot separate the libidinal and aggressive aspects of narcissism; that one cannot study 
narcissism without studying object relationships because investment in self and in 
objects occur simultaneously and influence each other; and that pathological narcissism 
cannot be seen as a mere fixation of infantile narcissism (which implies an understanding 
of “development” as potentially containing radical breaks).  That narcissism qua disorder 
should be thus naturalized by Kohut, while Kernberg recognizes its aberrant character, 
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recalls (at least from one perspective) the naturalization of the ego by ego-psychology, 
and its positioning as alienated and illusory from the Lacanian perspective.    
19 In terms of the history of secularization and of the privatization of religion, it is as if 
for the subject on the edge between reason and unreason, the void of internal value is 
driven to swallow and destroy the absolute or objective value found (but also not 
found) on the outside. 
20 It would be instructive, although this exceeds the scope of the present introduction, 
to compare/contrast Cantin’s approach with the discussion of the “borderline” by Julia 
Kristeva in Powers of Horror:  an Essay on Abjection, where Kristeva takes Louis Ferdinand 
Céline as her main illustration, and also with Serge André’s detailed reading of Céline in 
terms of perversion in L’imposture perverse.  For Kristeva the abject is the (primally 
repressed) space between subject and object, and abjection our (universal) experience 
of belonging to that space.  Kristeva mobilizes the figure of abjection and the borderline 
states it names as a way of characterizing a level of all human experience that becomes 
particularly manifest in certain individuals.  Neither neurosis nor psychosis (and thus 
beyond the unconscious [6-7]), the borderline state of abjection is akin both to 
problematic narcissism—“a kind of narcissistic crisis” (14) and to perversion: “The 
abject is related to perversion.  The sense of abjection that I experience is anchored in 
the superego.  The abject is perverse because it neither gives up nor assumes a 
prohibition, rule, or law, but turns them aside, misleads, corrupts” (15).   As a French-
Bulgarian analyst with both Lacanian and object-relations interests, Kristeva’s theory of 
the abject needs to be read as the attempt to synthesize these traditions.  More 
specifically with relation to Lacan’s œuvre, and as I hope to explore further elsewhere, 
this theory of the abject constitutes her detailed answer to his seminar from 1956-7, La 
relation d’objet, especially his analysis of phobia and perversion there.   Serge André’s 
illuminating account of Céline (from 1993) in terms of Lacan’s theory of perversion, 
together with Kristeva’s characterization of abjection as akin to perversion (from 1991), 
as well as Kernberg’s attempts—to my mind only partially successful—to distinguish 
between perversion and “borderline” conditions in Aggression in Personality Disorders and 
Perversions (1992), leave to further research the resolution or clarification of the tension 
between the assimilation of the “borderline” to an exacerbation of the hysterical failure 
of the seduction-fantasy, on the one hand, and its assimilation to the disavowal of 
castration, on the other hand.    
21 Michael Rustin summarizes the object-relations theory of the “borderline” usefully as 
the “recognition that patients can become paralyzed in a psychic borderland between 
paranoid-schizoid and depressive modes of functioning”  (Reason and Unreason, 129).  
Note also that the position articulated by Peter Fonagy et al on “borderline” states as 
based on a failure of “mentalization” is a more cognitive-informed approach to the 
“same” question of the accession to the symbolic order that Cantin thematizes, and that 
Fonagy even phrases this accession in terms of “symbolization” (377 passim).   Thanks 
to both Sander Gilman and Ralph Beaumont for pointing me to the important works of 
Fonagy et al.  
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